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Territorial Seas - 3000 Year Old Question
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to shipping to and from
Israel, an action which helped precipitate a war;1 in 1968, the U.S.S. Pueblo,
a United States Naval vessel, was seized by the naval forces of North
Korea;2 in 1969, a Peruvian gunboat seized one United States flag fishing
vessel and fired on others;3 again in 1969, a Soviet fishing fleet was warned
to remain more than twelve miles off the east coast of the United States.4
These four seemingly unrelated incidents, and others like them, all have
at least one factor in common-all involve questions of claims to terri-
torial jurisdiction over coastal waters. The concept of territorial waters
is one of the most well established in international law today, and yet no
other concept is so widely disputed or has so many conflicting interpreta-
tions applied to it. Despite many attempts at settlement, no really accept-
able definition or limit to national claims over coastal waters has ever
been reached. It is the purpose of this comment to explore the various
facets of the problem thus presented, including the history and back-
ground of the problem, the theories relating to freedom of the seas and
national claims to portions of those seas, and the attempts in this century
to reach a settlement. Finally an attempt will be made to present a possible
solution to the problem, if indeed there is such a solution.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define and understand the
terms which will be used throughout this comment. International law today
generally recognizes three board divisions of the waters of the earth, i.e.,
inland waters, territorial waters, and the high seas.' The inland waters
I The question of Israeli rights to use the Strait of Titan is one of the central questions which
must be settled before there can be any satisfactory peace in the Middle East. For a general discus-
sion of the problems, see, e.g., Salans, Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran: Troubled Waters, 94
U.S. NAy. INST. PRoc. 54 (1968); Barrett, United Nations Peacekeeping, 91 U.S. NAy. INST.
PROC. 37 (1965); Cagle, The Gulf of Aqaba-Trigger for Conflict, 85 U.S. NAv. INST. PROC. 75
(1959).
2NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1968, at 13. The United States did not attempt to refute the North
Korean claim to a twelve mile limit, but based its protest of the seizure of the vessel on the fact
that there had been no violation of such waters. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 1968, at 30; NEws-
WEEK, Jan. 6, 1969, at 28.
' NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1969, at 50.
4 Id.
5 H. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 7 (2d ed. 1950). [Hereinafter cited as H.
SMITH]. See also Svarlien, The Territorial Sea: A Quest for Uniformity, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 333
at 334 (1962); Comment, Issues in International Law Created by Scientific Development of the
Ocean Floor, 19 Sw. L.J. 97 (1965).
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of a nation "comprise all the water areas, salt and fresh, which lie within
the base line of territorial waters." The main feature of all inland waters
is that, legally, the nation owning them has the same sovereignty over
them that it has over land areas within its borders.' The only limits on
the rights of the "owning" nation are those that it voluntarily surrenders
by treaty or other agreement, and these treaty limits are in fact mani-
festations of sovereign rights!
The territorial waters of a state extend outward from the limits of the
inland water/shore line of a coastal state. As will be seen in later sections,
the extent of the territorial waters vary from nation to nation, but no
nation claims less than three nautical miles. Generally, a coastal nation
possesses the same sovereign rights in territorial waters that it has in its
inland waters, the main difference being that territorial waters are subject
to a right of free and innocent passage by merchant vessels of other
nations. Ships passing through this belt must conform to the laws and
regulations of the state claiming the waters and are within that nation's
jurisdiction, but nevertheless they do have the right to pass."
The term high seas comprises all the waters of the earth beyond the
limits of territorial waters."0 With the exception of certain rules and laws
established by international agreement, the high seas are completely free
of any form of control, and international law recognizes no rights of
any particular nation in the high seas. All vessels, both commercial and
military, have a right to use the high seas and are subject only to the
jurisdiction and laws of the nation of that vessel's nationality."
In recent years, what may be considered a fourth classification of the
seas, commonly known as the "contiguous zone," has arisen. These zones
lie outside a belt normally claimed as territorial waters in what is normally
part of the high seas, but comprise areas in which a nation claims certain
rights and privileges less than those of territorial rights." Such claims
usually relate to such activities as fishing controls and rights, customs
enforcement, and defense interests. Many of the more recent problems
relating to territorial seas have arisen in this field of the law and will be
discussed at a later point.
II. BACKGROUND: GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
A. Sources Of The Law Of The Sea
The law of the sea, like virtually all other intersectional law, has two
6 H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 6.
'Id. See also C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA §§ 123-33 (6th ed. 1967)
[Hereinafter cited as C. COLOMBOS]; Comment, Issues in International Law Created by Scientific
Development of the Ocean Floor, 19 Sw. L.J. 97 at 103 (1965).
' Id. As with all rules, there are certain exceptions, in this case generally established by his-
torical usage, which will be discussed infra.
9 Id.
'0 H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 8.
" Id., and sources cited supra note 7.
12 Heizen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597,
634-36 (1959) [Hereinafter cited as Heizen]; C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at 5§ 121-23.
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main sources-custom and treaty.13 Customary international law has been
defined as follows:
Whenever and as soon as a line of international conduct frequently adopted
by States is considered legally obligatory or legally right, the rule which may
be abstracted from such conduct is a rule of customary International Law.'4
Customary law has from the dawn of history proven to be by far the
greatest source of the law of the sea. However, whenever a sufficient body
of customary international law has developed, it is often formalized by
treaty or convention, a process that has become increasingly frequent in
recent years." The importance of the treaty developed law is its more
binding nature.
There have, of course, been other sources of the law of the sea, such as
decisions of national or international courts and arbitrators, the opinions
of publicists, and even the consequences of war. 6 Yet even these sources are
generally rooted in custom or prior agreement.
While it is clear that the law of the sea has developed from a number
of sources, it should be remembered in considering the following sections
that whatever the source of the rules, it is the interests of the maritime
nations that ultimately controls.' Freedom of the seas, for example, is a
natural result of the interest in the free flow of commerce between na-
tions with a minimum of friction and danger. At the same time, the con-
cept of territorial waters, a concept in direct opposition to freedom of
the seas, is an outgrowth of national interests in military security and
other commercial interests." Therefore, the law of the sea contains two
diametrically opposed but coexisting concepts. Both have the same ulti-
mate source-the interests of coastal and maritime nations-and those
interests are at the bottom of the points presented below. But whatever
its source, the law of the sea is far from settled; it remains an active and
dynamic field, changing and growing as the interests of nations change.
B. The Beginnings Of The Law Of The Sea-The Mediterranean
The origins of the first rules of the law of the sea are lost in history,
except as those rules have been adopted by later civilizations as customary
law." It is reasonably clear that many ancient Mediterranean peoples and
nations considered the sea free and open to any legal and legitimate use.
"See, e.g., C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 3; H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 4-6; Carlisle, Three
Mile Limit: Obsolete Concept?, 93 U.S. NAY. INST. PRoc. 25 (Feb. 1967) [Hereinafter cited as
Carlisle].
141 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (8th ed. 1955).
" Carlisle, supra note 13, at 26.
16 Sweizer, Sovereignty and the SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile), 92 U.S. NAV.
INST. PROC. 32, 34 (Sept. 1966). See also C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 1-6; H. SMITH, supra
note 5, at 3-10.
7 Carlisle, supra note 13; Sweitzer, Sovereignty and the SLBM, 92 U.S. NAy. INsT. PROC. 32;
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CONCILIATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1963);
C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7; H. SMITH, supra note 5.
18 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CONCILIATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD
7 (1963).
" Id. See also Carlisle, supra note 13; Sweitzer, supra note 18; Gormley, The Development and
Subsequent Influence of the Roman Legal Norm of "Freedom of the Seas," 40 U. DET. L.J. 561
(1963).
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There is some evidence that the maritime nations of antiquity had at least
a limited concept of territorial jurisdiction over coastal waters."
The earliest comprehensive code of the law of the sea that has sur-
vived is known as the Rhodian Maritime Code."1 Rhodes conducted some
of the most widespread and comprehensive maritime commerce in the
ancient world, and, thus it is to be expected that they would have developed
a successful code of sea law. The general consensus is that the greater part
of our modern admiralty law has descended from that code.2" The Rhodian
Code passed on to us through Roman law, the basis of modern international
law of the sea and private admiralty law.'
The important factor of the Rhodian Code is that it recognized the
right of all nations to use the seas for legitimate commerce, and this right
was made a part of Roman law.' Rome exercised a broad measure of con-
trol over the Mediterranean and adjacent seas, but did not claim exclusive
ownership thereof. As stated by one author:
[Rome's] claim was not expanded into a claim involving any sort of property
right in the sea itself; the claim to imperium was not developed into a claim
of dominium. Beyond this, positive evidence exists that ...at least during
the period of Roman greatness ...the sea, and the fish in it, were open or
common to all men, for their use. . ..
While it is true that during this period there was no serious challenge to
Rome's power over the seas, this does not detract from the importance of
the influence of Roman concepts on our modern law. The significant point
is that even while one power reigned supreme, there was no claim on the
seas beyond the right to police them "for the public good,"' and this is
to a large extent the main feature of maritime law today. It is also im-
portant to note that while Rome did not claim ownership of the seas,
national interests did not require such a claim, nor was there a need to
claim any rights in specific territorial waters as distinct from the high
seas.
With the collapse of the Roman empire, law, both national and inter-
national, virtually ceased to exist. From this time until about the mid-
Fifteenth Century, there was no law of the sea beyond survival of the
fittest." Thus, a highly developed and established body of law relating to
the seas was lost for almost a thousand years, until necessity required its
resurrection.
20 Id. at 567. Carthage, for example, is known to have restricted severely the use of her port by
foreign vessels, while the city-state of Rhodes encouraged the use of what she considered her own
waters.2 1 1d. at 565.22 d. at 566-68.
2 3Id.24 id. at 562.
2 17. FENN, The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Waters 5 (1926).
26 Gormley, supra note 21, at 572.
27 It can be said that there was something of a freedom of the seas by default. There were no
national navies in Europe during this period and a merchant ship would become a temporary pirate
if profitable at the moment. There actually was little need for any body of sea law since trade was
irregular at best, and of no real importance for several centuries.
[Vol. 36
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C. After The Middle Ages: Again A Free Sea
Before proceeding with a detailed analysis of the development of the
legal position of the territorial sea in modern times, a brief background
of the basic concept of freedom of the seas is necessary. A number of
early ideas relating to territorial waters, and many of the conflicts relating
thereto, arise from theories of the law of the sea as developed in earlier
periods. As one author states the problem:
Much of the confusion concerning the breadth of the territorial sea and its
role can be attributed to an incomplete understanding of the high seas as
res conunis and of the relation of that concept to the various claims to
limited jurisdiction which were asserted during the two or three centuries
prior to the establishment of the modern territorial sea.'
Any knowledge of the history of the period of time covered in this
section will show clearly the tremendous influence of self interest of na-
tions on international law. The various theories adopted by the maritime
nations and the changes in those theories are a result of the following
major factors, among others:
1) The relative naval power of the nations involved and their abilities
to assert their influence at sea.
2) The importance of seaborne commerce to the economy of the na-
tions involved.
3) The alterations in the "balance of power" on the European continent
and changes in the various alliances.'
Among other factors which played a part were the religious relations and
disputes during the period of the Reformation, the growth of international
law in general, the tremendous growth in seaborn trade and exploration,
and the increasing importance of the "new world" and colonial growth."
General practice in the late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth Centuries was
based largely on the theory that the seas were res mullius and subject to
unilateral appropriation by any nation. 1 For example, Spain and Portugal,
the great seapowers of that time period, bitterly disputed which of the
two "owned" the Atlantic Ocean.' At this time, the nations who asserted
"ownership" were well able to enforce their claims.
It was not until the mid-Sixteenth Century that serious opposition to
the above claims arose. First, the King of Poland was able to effectively
dispute the Danish-Norwegian claims to the North Atlantic." In 1580, a
28Heizen, supra note 12, at 598.
2 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CONCILIATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD
7-10 (1963).
1
0 Id. at 7-8.
31 Heizen, supra note 12, at 598 citing T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 338 (1911).
32 As between these two nations, the argument was settled when Pope Alexander VI set a line
of demarcation in 1493, dividing the world and its oceans between the two great Catholic Powers.
In order to prevent, or at least lessen, friction between the two great Catholic powers of the age,
the Pope issued a Bull on 4 May 1493 dividing the oceans of the world and all "new lands" be-
tween the two. The dividing line was later altered by the Treaty of Tordesillas of 7 June 1494. The
Papal Bull and the treaty later became the basis for many Spanish and Portuguese claims and dis-
putes in the East Indies. Needless to say, other nations paid no attention to such claims. See W.
SCHURZ, THE MANILA GALLEON 287-302 (1939).
"Id. See also Heizen, supra note 12, at 598. The King of Poland was able to establish an alliance
of interested nations, notably with the Hanseatic League, which gave the power to dispute the claim.
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more widespread and lasting event took place. Spain, stung by the "priva-
teering" activities of Sir Francis Drake and other English captains, de-
manded of Elizabeth I of England a cessation of all activities hostile to
Spanish interests on the seas. Elizabeth reportedly answered the Spanish
demands by stating that:
[T]he use of the sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the
ocean belong to any people or private man, forasmuch as neither nature nor
regard of the public use permitteth any possession thereof."
Thus was given one of the first clear statements on freedom of the seas
since the end of Roman power in the Mediterranean.'
A few years later, in 1602, England refuted the Danish-Norwegian
theory of dominium based on the idea "that for the property of a whole
sea it is sufficient to have the banks on both sides, as in rivers. ' In re-
futing the Danish claim, England declared:
[T]hat through property of sea, in some small distance from the coast, may
yield some oversight and jurisdiction, yet use not princes to forbid passing or
fishing ... the which by Law of Nations cannot be forbidden ordinarily;
neither is it to be allowed that property of sea in whatsoever distance is
consequent to the banks, as it happeneth in small rivers. For then, by like
reason, the half of every sea should be appropriated to the next bank, ...
where the banks are proper to divers men; whereby it would follow that no
sea were common, the banks on every side being in the property of one or
other; wherefore there remaineth no colour that Denmark may claim any
property in those seas ... '
It should be noted that the above statement briefly referred to the idea
that nations could claim some property rights in coastal waters. The state-
ment also indicates recognition of a legal theory that will be expanded in
the following section-that national claims to navigable waters can be
divided into three main groups-inland waters, coastal waters, and the
high seas.'
In 1609, the first legal treatise concerning the law of the sea of any
consequence, Mare Librum, was written and published by Hugo Grotius. °
Clearly advancing the interests of his native Holland, Grotius fully sup-
ported the Elizabethan theory that the seas are res communis and not
subject to unilateral appropriation by any nation." In preparing this work
of tremendous importance, long used as a standard source of sea law,
Grotius drew heavily on the Rhodian/Roman law and current Mediter-
" These various captains were both privateers and pirates, depending on the circumstances and
whoever was making the claim at the time. England's government officially denied any connection,
but protected the individuals concerned and often issued letters of marque to attack Spanish ship-
ping even though England and Spain were not at war at the time.
" Heizen, supra note 12, at 599 citing FULTON, supra note 31, at 107.
a Elizabeth's words took on a more forceful meaning when, in 1588, the weather and English
guns smashed the Spanish Armada and broke Spanish control of the seas.
1
7 Heizen, supra note 12, at 599 citing FULTON, supra note 31, at 111.
s8 Id.
"1 See section I, supra.
4° GRootus, ON THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (Hogoffin, ed. & trans. 1916). For an analysis of
this work, see Gormley, supra note 21, and sources cited therein.
41 Id.
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ranean practice for his theories.' Therefore, the Dutch, and later even the
French, Spanish, and Portugese, joined the ranks of maritime nations ad-
hering to the legal principle of freedom of the seas.
Thus, by the middle of the Seventeenth Century the major maritime
nations, in the interests of their fishermen, their seaborne commerce, and
their naval power, had clearly settled on the most important retreat and
conflict from time to time.' Even at this time, however, there was clear
evidence in diplomatic correspondence and other sources that certain areas
of the sea were, and of necessity should be, subject to some measure of
control and domination by individual nations."
D. The Early Territorial Sea
For nearly two centuries following the acceptance of freedom of the
seas, the questions of what areas of the sea were in fact subject to na-
tional control and just what controls could be imposed continued to be
debated.' Ultimately, two general practices developed which later coalesced
and developed into the modern territorial sea.
1. The Canon-Shot Rule
For many years the popularly accepted theory was that of the Dutch
jurist Bynkershoek concerning the extent of territorial seas." Bynkershoek,
in Den Domino Mars Dissertatio, reasoned that a state's dominion of the
sea "ends where the power of arms ends." Thus, it was reasoned that,
since the shore-based cannon of the period had a range of approximately
one marine league (three nautical miles), this was the maximum breadth
of the sea that could be claimed by any nation. It was long assumed, there-
fore, that this "cannon-shot rule" was the rule establishing the territorial
sea.
Recent research, however, has revealed that the cannon-shot rule was
practiced long before Bynkershoek wrote his dissertation, and in a much
different and narrower sense than as a definitive measure of the territorial
sea and territorial rights." As practiced by most nations, the cannon-shot
rule was a matter of actual control as opposed to theoretical legal control.'
[T]he cannon-shot rule, as it existed in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century practice .. .merely provided that, for the purpose of preserving
the neutrality of the coastal state, the range of guns actually stationed on
the shore were under the protection of the coastal state [Emphasis added.]."'
Thus, a nation effectively claimed only those areas of the sea that could
actually be "occupied" by gunfire of shore batteries. Further, the idea
42 Gormley, supra note 21, at 587.
" For a discussion of some of these periods of conflict, see FULTON, supra note 31, at 145-50.
44Supra notes 41-43.
' Heizen, supra note 12, at 602.
46 See generally, Svarlien, The Territorial Sea: A Quest for Uniformity, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 333
(1962); Heizen, supra note 12; C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at §§ 102-03.
41C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 102.
48 Heizen, supra note 12, at 602-06.
49 Id. at 603.
50 Id.
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that the cannon-shot rule gave a definite measurement of a marine league
cannot be supported when one considers the ballistics of Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Century artillery. The maximum range of the most powerful
gun of the age was barely half of that distance, and the effective range
rarely exceeded more than half a mile under the best of conditions, a fact
not improved upon until late in the Nineteenth Century. 1
In reality, the cannon-shot rule was much more limited in scope than
being an attempt to exercise full jurisdiction over a portion of the sea as
if it were within the territorial boundaries of a particular nation. Its use
did not, a least formally, give rise to attempts to control navigation of
either commercial or war vessels through coastal waters, but was applied
to the limited purpose of protecting neutrality in time of war by provid-
ing areas of "protection" for the ships of all belligerents, and then only
when that protection could be enforced by cannon situated on the shore. 2
The importance of the cannon-shot rule is that it helped establish in
the body of international law the legal proposition that in order to
preserve certain national rights and interests, nations could exercise a
measure of control over certain areas of coastal waters. Further, its accept-
ance encouraged the development of more comprehensive rules and con-
trols as time passed.
2. Scandinavian Practice
At the time that the cannon-shot rule was being developed and practiced
in most maritime nations, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark-Norway
and Sweden were announcing and practicing a much broader and more
comprehensive claim of territorial sovereignty over the seas. These na-
tions seem to have been the first to establish a uniform belt of defined
measure, running the entire length of the coast as a territorial sea.
Denmark-Norway at one time claimed a large part of the North Atlantic
Ocean as a private territorial sea-an integral part of the national domain."
In the face of pressure and opposition from other nations, particularly
Great Britain and Holland, Denmark retreated on this claim at various
times to claims of limited jurisdiction, varying from a distance of two
to four Norwegian leagues (six nautical miles), depending on the type of
claim asserted. 4 Jurisdictional claims as to fishing rights were asserted
(and disputed) up to four Norwegian leagues from the Danish coast, and
in 1736 a decree was issued denying the right of any foreign vessel to
approach to within four leagues of Greenland for the purpose of estab-
lishing a trade monopoly.' During the Seven Years War, the Danes claimed
a neutrality zone of "one ordinary sea league" (then four nautical miles),
such zone to consist of a uniform belt along the coast." Several warring
nations attempted to have Denmark accept the more limited cannon-shot
" I U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFF., NAVAL ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY ix-x (1957).
"2 Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 210, 222 (1945).
'3 See section II(c) supra, and sources cited therein.
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rule, then in practice in most of Europe, but did not push their efforts
for fear that Denmark would enter the war. 7 The four nautical mile
neutrality zone remained in force, therefore, but only for the limited pur-
pose of neutrality. Finally, about 1811, formal claims of full territorial
sovereignty were applied to this same zone, to give Denmark a four mile
territorial sea which exists to this day. Swedish practice seemingly paral-
leled Danish practice during this period of time. Sweden was the first na-
tion to establish a territorial claim to the seas approximating the modern
territorial sea.
Just what effect the practice of the Scandinavian nations had on the
development of the territorial sea of today is impossible to tell. It is logical
to assume, however, that the effect was considerable. In the late Eighteenth
and early Nineteenth Centuries, the cannon-shot rule was obviously in-
adequate to meet the needs of the nations which had previously practiced
it. As more and more attention was given the claim to sovereign rights in
coastal waters, it can be assumed that the various coastal nations looked
to the long standing practice of Denmark and Sweden in formulating their
own claims.
3. Nineteenth Century Practice
The Napoleonic Wars seem to have been the spark that started most
nations on the path of adopting modern territorial seas. As with the can-
non-shot rule and Scandinavian claims, the actions of these nations were
rooted in the establishment of neutrality zones in a war, or series of wars,
which were largely decided at sea. In 1793, the United States found it nec-
essary to declare a neutrality zone along the entire length of its coastline,
the zone being a marine league of three nautical miles from the coast. 8 In
the notes to the British and French ministers in which the declaration of
the zone was declared, the use of such claims by other nations was noted,
and it was stated that the three mile limit was provisional and the right
to alter it was reserved."a It is unclear why the marine league was chosen
by the United States, but it is generally accepted that it was merely a
measure of convenience and one that would not be seriously disputed by
other nations."0 This neutrality zone became firmly established in 1794,
when a statute was passed providing in part that "the district courts shall
take cognizance of complaints .. . in cases of captures made within the
waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the coasts or
shores thereof."" In 1807, an attempt was made to establish a neutrality
5' Neutrality and neutrality zones carry heavy burdens in many instances. The neutral nation is,
for example, under an absolute duty to protect the vessels of either belligerent nation from those of
the other, by force if necessary. Further, neutrals are obligated to control the actions of any belli-
gerent warship while in their waters. The dangers inherent in such a position can be seen when one
looks at the position of Norway in the early months of the Second World War when that nation
was forced to protect German shipping passing through its waters and at the same time liberate
British and other nations vessels seized by the Germans. Norwegian actions led ultimately to in-
vasion by Germany, though the actions taken as a neutral were not the only factors considered by
Germany.
" Carlisle, supra note 13, at 26. See also Heizen, supra note 12, at 615-16.
59 Id.60 
Id.
"1 Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 6, 1 Stat. 384 (1845).
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zone of five nautical miles by a treaty with Great Britain, but the attempt
failed in both nations.2 Ever since that time, the United States has prac-
ticed the use of the three mile limit to territorial waters, though, as will be
seen, wider distances were used for particular purposes, such as fishing."'
In 1862, the United States' position was reaffirmed by Secretary of State
Seward, who stated that "this Government adheres to, recognizes and
insists upon the principle that the maritime jurisdiction of any nation
covers a full marine league from its coast."' Finally, the United States
Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction and hence all laws of the United
States, by law and tradition extended to "a marginal belt of the sea extend-
ing from the coast-line outward a marine league or three geographical
miles. " '
Great Britain, and through her most of the Commonwealth nations,
adopted the three mile limit largely through a process of assimilation and
expansion of the cannon-shot rule."M The rule formed the basis for the
claims in the seas in The Annae in which it was said, following a discussion
of the cannon-shot rule, that the boundary of territorial waters was recog-
nized to be three miles. The same rule and measurement were reaffirmed
in a series of later cases involving international law.'
With the adoption of the three mile territorial sea belt by the United
States and Great Britain, other coastal states rapidly followed suit, including
Germany, France, the Netherlands, China, and most Commonwealth na-
tions. Thus, by the beginning of the Twentieth Century the legal concept
of the territorial sea was well established in international law."' Most na-
tions accepted and adopted the one marine league of three nautical miles
as the measurement, while a few nations claimed the four nautical mile
German league, and a few nations made claims of up to twelve nautical
miles."' At this time, it also became evident that much broader claims were
being made by most nations for particular purposes such as customs and
smuggling control, fishing control, and movements of naval vessels.
Also at this time, there arose two general theories as to the degree of
sovereignty which could be exercised by the claiming nation. One school
asserted that the shore state had actual and full ownership of coastal
waters, with all of the rights and obligations which go with the owner-
2 See generally C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at §§ 692-93.
" See sections III and IV, infra.
04 Note to Secretary of the Navy Welles, 4 Aug. 1862, in I MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 705 (1906).
0SCunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
0' C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at §§ 105-08.
07 [1805] 5 C. Rob. 373, 385 c.
6 Stetson v. United States (The Alabama Claims), 4 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS
4332 (1929); Gann v. The Free Fisheries of Whitesable, [1865] 11 H. of L. Cases 192. However,
there remained a conflict between international law and British municipal law, in that the common
law and equity courts extended their jurisdiction only to the low water mark on the coast, and re-
fused to concern themselves with matters occurring beyond that point unless the events took place
aboard a British vessel. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 105. This dispute resulted in the enact-
ment of The Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, 41 & 42 vict. c. 73 (1878), which
declared that all coastal waters within one marine league of the British coast were part of Britain's
territorial domain.
"9 See generally Heinzen, supra note 12, at 615-19; H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 69-78.
70 Id.
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ship of territory.71 The other school claimed that the territorial sea remained
primarily a part of the high seas, subject only to limited rights in the
coastal state."2 The controversy was largely academic and there was little
difference in actual practice, whichever theory was applied. It does, how-
ever, demonstrate the fact that there remained serious questions and un-
decided issues among nations claiming territorial seas, and early in the
Twentieth Century, these nations finally began to make serious efforts to
reach a common settlement on the problems involved.
III. THE LOCATION OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA BELT
As mentioned in an earlier section, there are three major divisions of the
sea-inland waters, territorial waters, and the high seas." The location of
each, particularly the territorial sea, requires the determination of two
borders known as base lines, one between inland waters and territorial
waters, and another between territorial waters and the high seas. While
at first glance the fixing of these base lines would seem to be merely a
process of drawing a line parallel to a nation's coast, such is not the case.
In fact, the process is very often difficult and involves claims and disputes
over substantial areas of the sea.
A. Inland Waters/Territorial Waters Base Line Determination
In locations where the coastline is reasonably regular, without offshore
islands or indentations which are unusually deep in relation to their width,
(such as Start Bay on the English coast), the general rule is that the base
line for inland waters is the low-water line along that portion of the coast.7"
This is the rule adopted in 1958 in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zones." The low water mark in such cases is de-
termined "as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the
coastal State.'"6
Difficulties arise along coasts which are rough and deeply indented, such
as the coasts of Norway, Greece, and Scotland. Conflicts arise from the
natural desire of a nation to claim as inland waters those bodies which are
enclosed substantially within its land territory, and the opposition of those
asserting that such claims encroach illegally on the high seas.7" In areas
of a sea coast with such a rough configuration, the general practice is to
use a series of artificial lines drawn through a series of selected base points
along the coast. In many cases, this involves the use of headlands as base
points, thus making many indentations in a coast subject to the regime
of inland waters. This is the method commonly used by the Scandinavian
71 H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 9.2 
Id. at 10-11.
7 See section I, supra.
74 Id. at § 133; H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 7.
72 Draft Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zones, art. 3, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CoNF. 13/38 (1958). [Hereinafter cited as Convention on Territorial Seas.]
SId. See also C. COLOMsOS, supra note 7, at § 133.
7 H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 7.
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countries, and where the indentation is very narrow in relation to its depth,
there are seldom serious complaints."
The procedure used by the United States is more representative of most
nations. The Code of Federal Regulations provides in part:
At all buoyed entrances from seaward to bays, sounds, rivers, or other
estuaries for which specific lines are not described in this part, the waters
inshore of a line approximately parallel with the general trend of the shore,
drawn through the outermost buoy or other aid to navigation or any system
of aids, are inland waters ... .
This procedure has the effect of enclosing a greater expanse of waters
within the inland classification, and also has the advantage of providing
a fairly definite and easily ascertainable line from the point of view of
navigation.
The Convention on Territorial Seas and the Contiguous Zones adopts a
procedure that, effectively, allows any reasonable method of determining
the inner base line in cases in which the low water mark is inadequate.
Article 4 of the Convention states that:
(1) In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the
method of straight base-lines joining appropriate points may be employed
in drawing the base-line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured."
This article goes on to provide that the straight line method must bear
some close relation to the actual direction of the coast, and that waters lying
inside of that base line must be so closely linked to the adjacent land areas
as to "be subject to the regime of internal waters."' In drawing the
straight base lines, the Convention, taking a practical approach, allows a
nation to take into consideration its own peculiar economic interests,
though those interests and the resulting base lines must be supported by
long established customs and usage. 2 A further protection is provided in
that, if the straight base line method encloses areas traditionally considered
high seas, a right of innocent passage is reserved for all merchant vessels,
though in all other respects the inland waters regime is applicable. 3 Thus,
the Convention attempts to reach a middle ground in establishing methods
for determining base lines weighing the practical problems facing nations,
such as Norway with its deep and narrow fiords, against the rights of other
nations to use the high seas. The procedures presented above for determin-
ing the inner base line, and those presented below for the outer base line,
while applicable in most cases, do not provide answers for special situa-
tions such as major bays and islands, and discussion of these situations
will be presented later.
" See The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.J.C. 116.
79 14 C.F.R. § 82.2 (1964).
"Convention on the Territorial Seas, art. 4.
"8 Id.
82 Id.
"3 For a discussion of innocent passage, see section III infra.
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B. Delimitation Of The Outer Base Line
There are two widely accepted methods for determining the location of
the outer base line of the territorial sea. The first and most easily applied
and popular method is that which was adopted in the Convention on
Territorial Seas. This method simply requires that a line be drawn parallel
to the inner base line at a distance equal to that claimed as the width of
the territorial sea. Article 6 of the Convention declares that the outer base
line "is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point
of the base line equal to the breadth of the territorial sea."' This procedure
provides a territorial sea belt of uniform breadth along an entire coastline,
and effectively requires the determination of only one base line, the inner.
The second method, commonly called the "double circle" or "arcs of
circles" method, is generally used in those instances where the straight
line method of determining the inner base line is used, that is, when the
coastline is rough and indented.' The method consists of the drawing of
arcs with a radius equal to that of the width of territorial sea claimed from
recognized base points along the coast. A line is then drawn through the
points where the arcs intersect, and the resulting lines form the outer limit
of the territorial sea."6 Unlike the parallel line, the arc of circles does not
give a uniform territorial sea. The width will vary in distance from the
shore depending on the location of the various base points chosen.
In 1951, the International Court of Justice, in the Fisheries Case," was
presented with the problem of determining which of the above two
methods was the better. The case involved a dispute between Great Britain
and Norway over certain fishing areas off of the coast of and claimed
by Norway. In a split decision the Court decided that the straight line
method was the most applicable in the case presented. The decision was
qualified, however, by the fact that Norway had established her right
to use this method by long custom and usage, and that otherwise the
borders thus determined covered a larger area than normally recognized
as permissible claims to territorial waters.8 The dissenting judges preferred
the position of Great Britain and would have applied the low water mark
as the inner base line with a line parallel to that as the outer.'
The decision in the Fisheries Case was widely criticized as a departure
from the traditional method of using the low water mark as the determi-
nant of the territorial sea and thus allowing encroachment on the high
seas."' An analysis of the decision refutes the criticisms raised because the
Court clearly stated that the decision was based largely on the exceptionally
rough nature of the Norwegian coast. 1 Further, no nation can effectively
claim unnecessarily large areas of the sea since the validity of such claims
84 Convention on the Territorial Seas, art. 6.
S H. SMiTH, supra note 5, at 8; C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 125.
86 Id.
87 [1951] I.J.C. 116.




9 C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 128.
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"with regard to other States depends upon international law, 9 2 and inter-
national law really depends upon the acceptance of such claims by other
nations. The appropriateness of the International Court's decision in the
Fisheries Case was soon recognized by most nations and the straight line
method, with appropriate safeguards, was adopted seven years later in the
Convention on Territorial Seas.
C. Determining Base Lines In Special Cases
1. Islands
Serious questions as to the location of base lines and territorial seas arise
in the case of offshore islands. In those cases in which the island is within
the limit claimed by the owning nation, i.e., when a nation claims a
three mile limit the island is within three miles of the mainland, the belt
of waters around it will constitute the territorial sea. In other words, in
that case, the island carries no territorial seas of its own." This rule is
subject to modification, however, when the straight line method of de-
termining the inner base line is used since the island itself may be con-
sidered as one of the base points, making it, effectively, part of the main-
land. If the island is outside the territorial belt claimed by a nation, it is
generally considered to carry with it a territorial sea of its own. It is
generally agreed that rocks and banks which are exposed only at low tide
do not constitute islands and carry no territorial belt of their own." A
further point is that many nations claim that where the territorial belt of
an offshore island merges with that of the mainland, the area between the
island and the mainland is an area of internal waters and that the terri-
torial belt runs around the outer portion of the island.
Archipelagos present their own special problems. If a group of islands
is historically considered an archipelago for the purposes of determining
the territorial belt, the entire body of islands is considered as one unit,
and the inner base line is a series of straight lines from the outermost points
of the islands. The waters enclosed within the polygon thus formed are
considered internal waters." If the group of islands are determined to be
too far apart to form an effective archipelago, then each island is considered
to have its own territorial water belt.9'
2. Bays and Gulfs
There is no single, definite rule applicable to the measurement of the
territorial claim in bays and gulfs because of the importance attached to
historic and prescriptive considerations in each particular case. One very
general rule is recognized, however, in that indentations in the land that
are relatively narrow, generally six miles or less in width at the opening,
92 Id.
'3 H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 10-12; Id. at 129.
4 Id.
Convention on the Territorial Seas, art. 10.
9C COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 130. An example of such action is Indonesia, which declared
that its islands formed in archipelago for purposes of territorial and inland waters, thus cutting off
a large number of formerly international passages.
'7 id.
[Vol. 3 6
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
are universally considered to be inland waters, with the inner base line
measured from headland to headland."
The first serious attempt to establish a common rule of international
law for the measurement of territorial claims to bays that could not other-
wise be considered inland waters came in 1894 at the Institute of Inter-
national Law. For bays twelve nautical miles or less in width at their
opening, the Institute adopted the rule of establishing the base line from
headland to headland."' For larger bays, the Institute agreed that the base
lines, both inner and outer, should follow the sinuosities of the coast,
"unless a continuous usage of long standing has sanctioned a greater
width" than the twelve miles for the straight line measurement."4 The
question was again considered in the International Law Association Con-
ference at Vienna, in 1926, and the same basic rule was adopted."'
The limits that should be applied to bays next arose in 1951 in the
Fisheries Case, where the International Court refused to adopt any set rule,
since none of the procedures presented above had acquired the authority
of customary international law.5" Instead, the court stated that a nation
must determine for itself what claims should be made, local conditions
dictating the results, and then that nation had the duty of showing that
its claim was justified as a departure from the general rule that the
territorial belt must follow the coastline.5" The problem remains the same
today. The attempts at reaching a settled rule in the Convention on
Territorial Seas in 1958 was largely a failure, and generally the ques-
tion was left to the claiming states to settle among themselves by in-
terpreting the provisions of the Convention."' What has resulted, at
least in the United States and Great Britain, is an interpretation which
gives a twenty-four mile closing line from headland to headland, any-
thing larger requiring a line following the sinuosities of the coast."
Thus, there can be no precise answer to the question of how a base line
is drawn in a bay situation. Seemingly the problems peculiar to each bay
will have to be settled individually as disputes arise, largely on the basis
of historical claims and the ability to assert those claims. For example,
the position as regards Chespeake Bay in the United States arose in the
The Alabama claims following the War Between The States." The case
arose out of the sinking of the merchant vessel The Alleganean by the
C.S.S. Alabama within the bay. It was determined that the sinking occurred
'8Id. at § 183.
99C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 130.
100 1d.
,0 Id.
10 [1951] I.J.C. at 131.
I°0Id. at 164-65.
104H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 12.
*° See, e.g;, State of Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961); The Territorial Waters in
Council, 98 Statutory Orders & Regulations 771 (No. 291) (1964).
1'84 MOORE, supra note 77, at 4332 et. seq. The Alabama Claims arose as a result of captures
of U.S. merchant vessels during the War Between the States by the Confederate raider C.S.S. Ala-
bama. The United States and the merchants concerned claimed reparations from Great Britain for
the losses thus suffered, claiming that Britain had breached her neutrality by building the Alabama
for the Confederacy and then allowing the ship to "escape" to international waters, where she was
then armed and commissioned as a warship.
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within the territorial waters of the United States since the bay "from the
earliest history of the country has been claimed to be territorial waters
and that the claim has never been questioned."'' 7
The present state of the base line situation seems to be that most na-
tions will draw the inner base line from headland to headland where the
width at those points does not exceed twenty-four miles (other measures
may have been established by convention or treaty). Where the head-
lands are farther apart than that distance, the inner and outer base lines
will follow the course of the coast itself. However, if a nation can show
that it has historically claimed a different territorial sea in that gulf or
bay, and that claim has never been seriously disputed, then the historical
claim will be allowed to stand.
3. Inland Lakes and Seas
Completely land locked bodies of water seldom cause any serious
problems since there is little trouble in showing that they constitute inland
waters. Troubles arise, however, when two or more nations border on
an inland sea or lake. Unless agreement can be reached as to the limits
of the boundaries of each, the general rules applied and discussed above
for coastal states on the oceans will apply."' 8 Generally, where only two
nations border the body of water in question, agreement will establish the
line of demarcation through the middle of that body, such as with the
Great Lakes between Canada and the United States. 9 In those cases where
a larger number of nations border on the same body of water, or where
that body is widely used for navigation purposes, and there is an outlet
to the high seas, international conventions generally allow freedom of
navigation to all nations, applying a rule of innocent passage as with
normal territorial waters.1 ' Even where the outlet is bounded on both
sides by the same State, as with the Straits of Kertch, the general rule is
that there is a right of innocent passage, at least in times of peace."'
IV. LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA
The entire concept of the territorial sea is built on the idea that a coastal
nation, for various reasons, is entitled to certain special rights in an area
of the seas off of its shores. Today, all countries recognize at least a three
nautical mile limit, though many claims go beyond this distance.
A. The Extent Of Jurisdiction
As noted in the previous section, two schools of thought existed at the
beginning of the Twentieth Century as to the nature of the relationship
107 Id.
1°8C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 194; H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 12-15. For many years, this
procedure was used by the United States and Great Britain on the Great Lakes between Canada and
the United States until the entire border dispute was settled.
"" The settlement of the border dispute on the Lakes was part of a general settlement of the
borders between the United States and Canada, a dispute which had never been settled following
the United States War of Independence. The dispute was also part of -the cause of the War of 1812.
"' Convention on the Territorial Seas, art. 1.
... For a discussion of innocent passage, see section III, infra.
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of the coastal state with its adjacent seas. One, the more widely accepted,
held that the relationship is that of actual ownership, or the dominium
theory of ancient times. The other school, basing its assertions on the idea
that the territorial sea remained essentially a part of the high seas, claimed
that the coastal belt was subject only to certain limited and well defined
rights in the shore state.112 By the end of the first quarter of the Twentieth
Century, the dominium theory was the accepted norm. In 1930, the first
international conference on the territorial sea was convened by the League
of Nations in an attempt to settle many of the disputes relating to the
territorial sea. While generally unsuccessful in handling the major prob-
lems, one fact was made clear-almost all nations were in agreement that
the territorial sea forms a part of the actual territory of the claiming
coastal state.'
The position taken at the 1930 conference was firmly established and
reaffirmed at the Geneva Conference on the Territorial Seas and Contiguous
Zones. Article 1 of the Convention, adopted by 86 nations, provides that
"the sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its in-
ternal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the terri-
torial sea."1.. Commenting on this Article, the International Law Com-
mission stated that "the rights of the coastal State over the territorial sea
do not differ in nature from the rights of sovereignty which the State
exercises over the other parts of its territory..' ' 1 Thus, as applied today,
the theory of the territorial sea is based entirely on the ancient doininium
concept of territorial ownership by the claiming state. Like all rules of
law, however, there are exceptions to the rule of absolute dominion, and
the rights of the coastal state, as will be seen below, are subject to and
limited to some extent by other norms of international law and conven-
tion.
National rights in airspace over territorial seas came into question with
the growth of aviation following World War I. The Paris Conference
of 1919 which resulted in the International Aerial Navigation Convention
of 1919116 stated that a nation had absolute sovereignty in the airspace
over its territory, and included in the definition of territory those adjacent
seas recognized as territorial waters. The same principle was repeated in
the Pan American (Havana) Convention on Commercial Aviation of
192811 and the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (The
Chicago Convention). Most nations supplemented the international
agreements with pertinent national legislation claiming rights in airspace
over territorial seas. The Air Commerce Act of 1926119 of the United
112Svarlien, The Territorial Sea: A Quest for Uniformity, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 333-34
(1962).
"' H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 33.
114 Convention on the Territorial Seas, art. 1.
"'U.N. GEN. Assoc. OFF. REC., 11th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 12 (A/3 159) (1956).
16 11 L.N.T.S. 173 (1919). For a complete discussion of sovereignty in airspace, see D. BILLYOU,
AIR LAW Ch. III (2d ed. 1964).
11747 Stat. 1902 (1931).
'1861 Stat. 1180 (1947).
11944 Stat. 568 (1926).
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States provided in section 6 (a) that the United States has "complete and
exclusive sovereignty .. .above those portions of the adjacent marginal
high seas, bays, and lakes over which . . . the United States exercises
national jurisdiction.""'' The Federal Aviation Act of 1958121 accomplished
the same end by including in its definition of sovereign, national territory
"the territorial waters and the overlying airspace thereof."" Similarly, the
British Air Navigation Act of 1920'2 states that sovereign jurisdiction,
"extends . ..over the air superincumbent on all parts of His Majesty's
dominions and the territorial waters adjacent thereto. . ..",
Recently, with the growth of the ability to develop its resources, even
national rights in the seabed underlying territorial waters have come into
question. It is generally agreed today that such areas of the seabed, just
as the airspace above territorial waters, constitute part of the claiming
nation's territory.1 2' The Convention on the Territorial Seas and the Con-
tiguous Zones clearly recognized that a nation has territorial rights in
that portion of the seabed underlying its territorial sea and has full rights
to control and development.1" Today, problems arising from development
of the resources of the seabed, as with problems relating to the territorial
sea and airspace above it, come primarily from a lack of definition of the
breadth of the territorial sea or contiguous zone claimed.
B. Types Of Jurisdiction Exercised
Generally, the rights of nations and the types of controls exercised over
territorial waters have been divided into four broad categories:
(1) Jurisdiction over foreign vessels, both merchant ships and ships
of war;
(2) police, customs, and revenue functions;
(3) fishery rights; and
(4) the establishment of defense and security zones.127
In each of these categories, the statements given above relating to the nature
of sovereign control and dominion of a nation in its territorial sea apply,
with one exception, that of the right of innocent passage. The major point
of dispute relating to the breadth of the territorial sea and the contiguous
zones arise from interests in each category, and, as will be seen in the next
section, such interests are inherent in the varying claims laid to territorial
waters.
1. Jurisdiction over Foreign Vessels and the Right to Innocent Passage
A coastal state, being sovereign, has legislative power over its territorial
sea and may prescribe rules and regulations governing the activities of any
120 Id.
121 72 Stat. 731 et seq., as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1964).
122 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 101 (35), 72 Stat. 737, as amended, 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C.
1301(35) (1964).
12210 & 11 Geo. 5, c.80.
124 Id. at Preamble.
122See, e.g., Comment, 19 Sw. L.J. 97 (1965) and sources cited therein.
121 Convention on the Territorial Seas, art. 24. See also Convention on the Continental Shelf,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L 5555 (1958).1 27
C. COLOMBOS, supra note 1, at § 142; H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 33.
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vessel within that portion of the sea. In addition to specific rules and
regulations relating to such matters as rules of the road, pilotage, and
similar navigation and sailing requirements, foreign vessels are subject
to the criminal and civil laws of the state into whose waters they enter.
The rule commonly applied by the United States and Great Britain was
clearly stated by the United States in Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon"28 that:
[A] merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering the territorial limits
of another, subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter. The jurisdiction
attaches in virtue of her presence just as with other objects within those
limits. Of course, the local sovereign may out of consideration of public
policy choose to forego the exertion of his jurisdiction or to exert the same
in only a limited way, but this is a matter resting solely in his discretion. '
France and a number of other nations, on the other hand, tend to adhere
to a rather strict observance of the concept of the law of the flag, a rule
whereby all questions relating to a vessel's internal and other affairs not
affecting the interests of the territorial sea state are left to the authorities
of the flag state."M In practice, there is little difference in the outcomes of
the two procedures. British and United States courts will assert jurisdic-
tion, but will decline to render a decision on the basis of international
comity and usage, deferring to the courts of the flag state.' In the alterna-
tive, these courts will render a decision, but will apply the law of the flag
state themselves.1 2' In cases which affect its own citizens or interests, the
nation claiming the area of the sea in which the event took place will
usually take full jurisdiction."N There are no firm rules in such cases,
however, and ultimately the decision as to whether or not to take juris-
diction is up to the authorities particularly concerned. What has been
stated in the above paragraph applies equally to both persons and property
and to the vessel itself.
There is one major exception to the general rule that a nation has
absolute jurisdiction and control over its territorial waters and vessels
therein, that exception being the international rule of innocent passage.
The rule grew out of the concessions granted by nations claiming terri-
torial seas in the past century in order to justify its right to control areas
of the high seas. Basically, it provides that foreign vessels have a right of
innocent passage in those areas of the sea normally used for the movement
of seaborne commerce even though such areas are claimed as territorial
seas by another nation." The passage includes the right to free and inno-
cent movement, and the right to stop and weigh anchor so long as the
stopping is incident to the normal conduct of navigation." Foreign vessels
128262 U.S. 100 (1923).
I29Id. at 107.
la C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 317.
.. See, e.g., Regis v. Lewis, [1857] 7 Cox's Cr. 277; Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100
(1923).
1" See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
'
5 5 See, C. COLOMBOS, suPra note 7, at §§ 303-55.
34 See, e.g., AM. Soc'Y INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS OF FIFIETH ANN. MEETING 25-28 (1956);
REISENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (1942); H. SMrrH,
supra note $, at 34-39; Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 MICH. L. REv. 639 (1966).
135 Id.
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have the further right to enter territorial waters when compelled to do
so by weather or other hazards of the sea. A nation claiming the territorial
waters subject to innocent passage is not entitled under international law
to levy tolls or duties for that passage beyond payment for special services
rendered to the passing vessel." Even while in territorial waters on the
basis of innocent passage, however, a merchant vessel must observe the
laws, rules, and regulations of the nation claiming those waters. In time
of war or other national emergency, a nation is generally recognized to
have the right to limit or deny completely passage of merchant ships
through portions of its territorial waters if reasonable grounds for such
limits exist.'37
Whether or not warships have a right of innocent passage is still an
open question. Unlike the situation of merchant vessels, there is no com-
mercial interest involved and there may be danger at times to the nation
whose waters are being used. International conferences and conventions
have recognized the principle of innocent passage, but have refused to
grant an absolute right.' At best, the right of passage for a warship is
granted only subject to special rules and regulations of the nation whose
waters are being used." The requirements for the passage of warships
vary from nation to nation. Some require at least notification of the
intended passage while others require not only notice, but also actual
authorization.
International law does attempt to distinguish between passage through
a territorial straight connecting two portions of the high seas and passage
through the territorial waters of a nation which do not form part of a
strait.'" Where the strait in question opens on the unenclosed high seas
on both sides, an absolute right of free passage is normally recognized for
warships in peacetime. 4 ' In the few cases where the strait opens into an
"enclosed" sea, such as the Black Sea, international agreement usually
limits the number of warships which can pass through the straits, except
for those nations which have coasts on the enclosed sea. An example is
the Montreux Convention of 1936 concerning the Dardanelles."
Unlike merchant ships, warships and other ships of state in foreign
territorial waters do not become subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal
state." This result is based on the theory that the warship forms a part
of the territory of the nation whose flag it flies. While normally bound
to follow rules of navigation and sailing, the warship cannot be seized
"' C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 144.
"'See discussion accompanying note 63.
138 H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 37.
'39 Id.
'
45 The Corfu Channel Case (Great Britain-Albania), [1949] I.J.C. 4. The case arose when two
British vessels were sunk by mines laid by Albania in an international strait with resulting heavy
loss of life. In holding Albania liable for reparations, the international court determined that the
Corfu Channel had historically been international waters and could not be closed by unilateral
actions.
141 Id.
142 H. SMITH, supra note 5, at 36.
141 Id. See also C. COLOMsOS, supra note 7, at § 277.
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or interfered with in any manner by judicial proceeding.'" The United
States Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon4 ' was
faced with the problem of determining the ownership of a vessel which
had been illegally seized when used as a merchant vessel by her American
owners and converted into a warship by her French captors. Chief Justice
Marshall, in refusing to permit the seizure of the vessel by a United States
admiralty court stated:
It seems to the Court to be a principle of public law that national ships of
war, entering the port of a friendly Power open for their reception, are to
be considered as exempted by the consent of that Power from its juris-
diction.'"
The general rule seems to be that by admitting a foreign warship to its
territorial waters, either impliedly or specifically, a nation waives any
claim to jurisdiction. If a breach of a nation's laws are committed by a
foreign warship, the only recourse, apparently, is to lodge a complaint
with the nation owning that ship. As stated by the Institute of Interna-
tional Law in 1928, "[wlarships cannot form the subject of seizure . . .
by any legal means whatsoever, or by any judicial procedure, [however,
they must respect and obey] the local laws and regulations . . . relating
to navigation, anchorage and sanitary police."1 "
2. Other Legal Rights in the Territorial Sea
The other categories listed above, including police and revenue func-
tions, fishery controls, and defense zones, will not be discussed in this
section. The legal rights relative to each present no particular problems
as such. The problems arise from attempts to expand the territorial sea
or extend such rights to areas outside of the purely territorial sea, and
will be discussed in the following section.
V. THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA: No SOLUTION IN SIGHT
As seen from prior sections, the primary values in the sea itself are the
right to use the waters for transit and the right to develop and exploit
the economic resources in and under the seas. Great progress has been
made in establishing a workable and acceptable legal regime governing
these values and rights through international conventions and treaties." 8
Virtually every nation has, for example, accepted the doctrine of innocent
passage for merchant vessels and many have extended the same right to
vessels of war and state. Fishing disputes, such as those in the North Sea
and the conflict between Great Britain and Iceland have been settled by
treaty. Even in the area of development of the resources of the seabed,
144 Id.
1417 Cranch 116 (1812).
141d. at 125.
147 Cited in C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 279.
141 See generally, Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accom-
plished, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1958); Lonsdale, "No Contest" on the Fishing Grounds, 94 U.S.
NAv. INST. PRoC. 62 (July 1968); Neblett, Freedom of the Seas-For Fishing, 85 U.S. NAy. INST.
PROC. 85 (Feb. 1959); M. MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1952); Comment, 19 Sw. L.J.
97 (1965).
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progress has been made with little friction. In the issue of the breadth of
the territorial sea, however, there has been a consistent failure to reach
any sort of lasting agreement, and the differing views seem to grow farther
apart with each attempt at settlement. There have been three major inter-
national conferences on the law of the sea and many smaller ones, but
every one, despite progress in other areas, resulted in deadlock over the
question of the breadth of the territorial sea. This section will attempt
to present the basic reasons that such a deadlock exists today, even though
the underlying reasons have been for the most part settled by more direct
routes.
A. The 1930 Hague Conference
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, most maritime nations
accepted a limit of three nautical miles as the maximum extent of terri-
torial waters, though at times several asserted wider claims without
effect. "" Within a very few years, however, for numerous reasons, the
situation had changed and many states extended their claims to distances
varying from four to twelve nautical miles, some claiming absolute juris-
diction in these extended areas and some jurisdiction for limited purposes,
usually fishing controls. The situation soon became so confused and so
many conflicts arose that in 1930 the League of Nations called an inter-
national conference designed to settle and codify a general rule for the
breadth of the territorial sea.
There was a general willingness among the 38 nations attending the
conference to accept a three nautical mile limit for the actual territorial
sea, though the Scandinavian countries asserted their historical four mile
claim. The main point of conflict was the desire of many of the nations
to include in the proposed code national rights to exercise limited juris-
diction in a zone contiguous to the territorial sea."" The demands for the
contiguous zones were intended primarily for protection of fishery rights
and enforcement of customs laws."1 Several states, notably Great Britain
and Australia, adhered to their long standing positions of refusing to
recognize any kind of claim extending beyond three nautical miles."2
The delegates, despite long and hard efforts, were unable to reach any
compromise, largely because of the unyielding stand taken by Great Britain,
and the conference deadlocked and finally broke up without any result
on the breadth of the territorial sea, though there was general agreement
on the legal status and rights related to territorial waters."H
"'See Heinzen, supra note 12, at 629-37 for a discussion of state practice at this time.
150See CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INT'L LAW, THE HAGUE [1930], MINUTES
OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE at 123-27. See also, Heinzen, supra note 12, at 636-37.
.1 The nations accepted the three mile limit without additional claims or recognition of claims
of other nations to anything but three miles. Three of those states indicated that limited contiguous
zones would be acceptable, and four others stated that they would give the matter consideration.
Great Britain, Australia, and India, however, refused to even consider any claim beyond three miles
for any purpose. Heinzen, supra note 12, at 637 n.176.
15 id.
'53 C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at 5 117.
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B. Development And Practice Between 1930 And 1958
There was little serious effort among nations to establish a definite
breadth for the territorial sea between 1930 and 1945 because of the un-
settled international situation and the intervention of the Second World
War. One point of importance during this period was the wider acceptance
and recognition of the existence of contiguous zones. In 1945, for example,
the United States, long a supporter of the position that the maximum
territorial sea was three miles, declared that a fishing conservation zone
existed outside of the three mile territorial waters of the United States.'5'
In doing so, the United States stated that similar actions of other nations
would be recognized up to a limit of twelve miles from the coast, but that
no limit on rights to free use of the seas would be asserted or recognized
in others. Almost at once, a number of other nations in the western hemis-
phere followed suit, although some went far beyond the twelve miles
established by the United States." Other nations extended their claims
to similar zones, and some reasserted old claims. While in many cases
there were protests, and later open conflict over such claims, most were
recognized by most other nations, either formally or by de facto recog-
nition through failure to protest effectively.""
Another major factor which encouraged expanded claims to territorial
seas or contiguous zones was the development of the technical abilities to
profitably exploit the resources of the seabed. Again, the United States
took the lead in declaring its position in this particular field, when in
1945, by Presidential Proclamation, claim was laid to the "natural re-
sources of the ...continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous
to the coasts of the United States. . . ."" Again, several other nations
evidently interpreted this action as a repudiation of an established rule
of international law and quickly followed with claims that the full terri-
torial sea was determined by the limits of the continental shelf."' The
results were similar to those flowing from the United States' fishery procla-
mation of the same year, though not as widespread. Most nations refused
to recognize such extensive territorial claims, though little effective action
was taken to refute the claims.
Two other very important events occurred following World War II
which, as will be seen, exerted and continue to exert a much greater in-
fluence on the problems of the territorial sea than would normally be
expected. The first was the division of the nations of the world into the
various political camps of the cold war. The constant threat of war, the
development of new and deadlier weapons, and the use of economic war-
154 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (1945), 59 Stat. 885 (1945).
's Some of these nations, including Argentina, Chile, El Salvadore, and Peru, went so far as to
extend this claim to the waters overlying the entire continental shelf, a claim vigorously protested
by the United States. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 161.
6 In some areas, the situation deteriorated to the point of undeclared war, as in the Anglo-
Icelandic and Anglo-Norwegian fishing disputes. See, e.g., sources cited in note 172 supra. The
United States has extended such de facto recognition to the claims of Peru to a fishing zone of 200
nautical miles by paying fines levied on U.S. fishing boats seized in those waters, though payment
was made with protest.
*
7 Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 10 'Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
"'Comment, 19 Sw. L.J. 97, 109 (1965).
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fare made the nations of the world take a very long look at their territorial
sovereignty and integrity and gave increasing importance to the terri-
torial sea. It also became increasingly difficulty to reach any reasonable
settlement as to the breadth of the territorial sea because of the prob-
lems inherent in getting two warring political camps to agree on any-
thing of such world-wide importance. The second major development was
the end of the so-called colonial era and the emergence of a large number
of new nations. These nations were intent on asserting their new-found
political rights as members of the community of nations and were averse
to agreeing to anything that was supported by former colonial masters,
no matter how beneficial.
With the exception of a few very expanded and inflated claims imme-
diately after the end of World War II, there was little actual change in
the situation involving the measurement of the territorial sea proper. The
United States and Great Britain led a small group of nations which denied
any right to extend the territorial sea beyond three nautical miles.""
The greater number of maritime nations, however, varied their claims
between four and twelve nautical miles, and it was generally accepted
as a rule of international law that twelve miles was the maximum that
could be legally claimed by any littoral state. The most important de-
velopment during these years was the acceptance by most nations of the
legal position of the contiguous zone in international law.
C. The 1958 And 1960 Geneva Conventions
In 1945, the task begun by the League of Nations in attempting to
codify the laws of territorial waters devolved on the International Law
Commission of the United Nations. In 1951, the Commission declared
that the legal regime of the territorial sea was one of the most important
matters needing codification in international law, and urged immediate
action.' Finally, in 1958, under the auspices of the United Nations, the
first serious conference on the territorial sea since 1930 was convened in
Geneva, Switzerland. Eighty-six nations participated in the conference,
and in general, it was successful. Four conventions, one each on fisheries,
the high seas, the continental shelf, and the territorial seas and contiguous
zones were signed, and have all become effective.""' As in 1930, however,
no satisfactory settlement could be reached on the breadth of the territorial
sea, even though the major underlying problems had been solved to a
great extent by the four conventions that were adopted.
1. Positions of the Attending Nations
The major maritime nations at the 1958 and 1960 Conferences displayed
... The United States did not assert its position with great force, as is indicated by the expansion
of contiguous zones for fishing and development of the continental shelf. However, it did refuse to
recognize any full claim to sovereignty which tended to restrict the mobility of its naval forces. See
section IV (D) (4) and sources cited therein.
165U.N. Doc. No. A/CN-4/42 (1951).
... For a full discussion, see Manley, The Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea as a Step
in the International Law Making Process, 25 ALBANY L. REV. 17 (1961); Dean, The Geneva Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1958).
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an unexpectedly conciliatory attitude and showed a definite desire to reach
a compromise solution on the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea.
Great Britain, departing from its usual stand of refusing to recognize
any territorial sea claim beyond three nautical miles, put forth a proposal
which read that:
(1) [T]he limit of the breadth of the territorial sea shall not extend beyond
six miles. Extension to this limit shall not, however, affect existing rights of
passage for aircraft and vessels . . . outside three miles ... "'
The British proposal was not even seriously considered by most of the
nations present, and was rapidly defeated.
The United States and Canada presented a compromise proposal which,
it was hoped, would appeal not only to the nations supporting the British
position, but would give its opponents at least a portion of their demands.
The compromise plan thus submitted involved the same six mile territorial
sea proposed by the British, but added an additional six mile contiguous
zone for fishery control. " ' The United States-Canadian proposal provided
further that any nation which could show that it has historically fished
in waters which were included in the territorial sea or contiguous zone
of another state would be permitted to continue such action for a period
of ten years. When no such practice could be shown by a nation, the
concerned state could then claim exclusive jurisdiction in the six mile
contiguous zone for fishing.'" Though a great many nations supported
this proposal, the block voting of particular interest groups at the con-
ference defeated attempts to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary
for passage, even though at the 1960 Conference the proposal was within
one vote of success.
Blocks of nations with particular common interests made it virtually
impossible to reach a satisfactory solution at the conference. The Soviet
block nations, a total of ten votes, were adamant in refusing to accept
any limit that imposed a distance of less than twelve nautical miles for a
true territorial sea." The second major bloc, and one which gave its sup-
port to the Soviet Union in 1960, was composed of the various Arab
states, a total of eleven votes. The third discernible group was composed
primarily of newly independent nations. The South American nations
were joined by a few others to form a shifting and rather amorphous body
of states which shared several characteristics. Basically, this group was made
up of those nations which asserted particular economic interests which
required the protection of extremely wide contiguous zones, often in
excess of 200 nautical miles.6"
2. Situation at the End of the Conferences
The international situation at the end of the two conferences was one
of even greater confusion than before. One definite result was the virtual
102 C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at § 11.9.
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end of serious adherence to the traditional concept of the three mile limit.
While a number of nations, including the United States, paid lip service
to the traditional breadth, their actions clearly indicated that the general
feeling was one of freedom to extend territorial waters and contiguous
zones unilaterally. There were limits, however, to the freedoms taken by
most nations, and the greater number did adhere to the doctrine that no
territorial sea should extend beyond twelve nautical miles. The situation
as it existed in 1958 after the end of the first conference and as it exists
today was summed up by Max Sorensen:
The situation remains as [the International Law Commission] described
it-state practice is not uniform and certain states object to a territorial sea
wider than three miles. On the other hand, it also remains the position [of
the] overwhelming majority of . .. Governments . .. that no state is entitled
to extend its territorial sea beyond twelve miles. . . . It is fair to assume,
however, that after the Conference, the three-mile limit can never again be
taken into consideration as a possible element of any negotiated solution."7
Even the United States, still proclaiming that it would recognize no claim
of territorial waters beyond three miles in 1966 enacted legislation extend-
ing exclusive fishing rights to twelve miles.' 5 The act was accompanied
by statements that the United States considered the right to extend ex-
clusive fishing zones unilaterally to be established in international law,
but only to a maximum of twelve miles.
Great Britain returned to a similar position on the three mile limit, but
its stand on the contiguous zones was somewhat modified. While stating
that the British government still considered unilateral extension of terri-
torial seas and contiguous zones both unnecessary and improper, recog-
nition would be given to claims of contiguous zones for the purpose of
enforcement of customs, fiscal, and sanitary regulations."9 British recog-
nition was conditioned, however, in that no claim beyond twelve miles
would be recognized under any circumstances, and that any claim to a
contiguous zone by another nation would have to be accompanied by a
statement that no claim would be made to a territorial sea greater than
three miles."'
D. What Basis For Dispute?
The most commonly asserted bases for extension of territorial sea claims
and the wide contiguous zones are enforcement of customs and fiscal laws,
protection of fishery resources, and national security. The supporters of
the severly limited territorial sea and contiguous zone rely on the need for
free and efficient flow of seaborne commerce, efficient exploitation of the
resources of the seas for all nations, and the problems presented to coastal
states in terms of neutrality, police, and similar functions. An analysis of
the points relied on discloses that they no longer have any real relevance
167 Sorensen, Law of the Sea, paper cited at Carlisle, supra note 13, at 27-28.
1s8 Id.
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today, either because of surrounding circumstances or because of the
settlements reached in various treaties and conventions.
1. Customs, Fiscal, and Police Functions
The importance of territorial sea claims to the enforcement of customs
and fiscal laws has virtually disappeared from the scene in light of today's
trade practices. Enforcement of anti-smuggling laws played a large role
in the development of the concept of the territorial sea, but conditions
have undergone a tremendous change since the smuggling days of the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Nations no longer depend on cus-
toms as a primary source of income, and even the use of customs as a
protective device for local industry has diminished in today's international
commerce. The importance of the territorial sea to customs enforcement
was a valid argument in an era when smuggling was carried on by the
shipload in order to avoid restrictive tariffs and taxes, but the nature of
today's commerce has made such actions largely unnecessary and has re-
moved the tremendous profit from this form of bulk smuggling. Instead,
smuggling has centered around small, highly valuable items, ranging from
narcotics to diamonds, which are usually shipped in conjunction with
legally transported cargos which go through the usual forms of customs
controls. Finally, it is common practice today to use a contiguous zone
for the enforcement of customs controls in those areas where wider dis-
tances are in fact required. Thus, customs enforcement can be carried on
without imposing the restrictions on the high seas inherent in full terri-
torial control.
Much the same can be said for enforcement of general police and safety
controls as for customs. Generally, the rules of navigation and safety are
controlled by international convention in areas outside of territorial waters,
and special controls, such as required pilotage are seldom necessary even
as far from the coast as three miles. Modern navigation aids and interna-
tional controls in the police and safety field have made full territorial
control both unnecessary and undesirable.' 1
2. Protection of Fisheries
It is conceded that the fishing industry is often of vital importance to
the economy of a coastal state. Therefore, there is support for the theory
that a wider territorial sea is necessary to protect those interests. Closer
analysis, however, reveals that even a twelve mile territorial claim with
exclusive fishing rights would not significantly imiprove most national
fishing industries when they are considered in relation to resources out-
side that distance.
The main desire of the states relying on wide territorial seas for fishery
control is primarily the conservation of fishery resources and the de-
velopment of their domestic fishing industries. Oddly enough, many states
can only be hurt in the long run by such measures. Those states with a
relatively small amount of coastline that attempt to exclude fishing by
171 See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 7, at §§ 147-80.
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other nations over very wide areas off their coasts will find similar action
taken against their own fishermen. So long as fishing is plentiful inside
the territorial area claimed, there is no difficulty for the claiming state, but
should the fish migrate to other areas, these nations may well find their
fishermen excluded from the most profiitable areas by other nations which
felt themselves forced to adopt similar protections. In those cases where the
coastline is relatively long, few nations possess the resources and abilities
to properly patrol and police the areas claimed.'
The conservation argument ignores another major fact. Even if terri-
torial claims were extended to twelve miles for fishery control by all na-
tions, the greater portion of the seas would still be open to largely un-
controlled fishing. As high seas areas adjacent to territorial waters or even
contiguous zones were heavily fished and depleted, the fish inside the
boundry would tend to migrate out for a more even distribution, thus
defeating the entire conservation program."
In a few cases, the assertion that resources need protection through a
territorial sea bears no relation to reality. Libya, for example, extended its
territorial sea to twelve miles claiming as the sole purpose the protection
of its fisheries, which, it was stated at the 1958 Conference, formed a
vital part of the economy and food supply of the entire nation.74 How-
ever, a United Nations research team had reported that
[o]ne of the factors which hinder the development of the fishing industry
is the very low consumer demand [in Libya]. . . . Catches could easily be
increased, since fish are abundant, but any increase is . . . opposed by the local
fishermen, because it would lead to lower prices. 7s
Russia too relies on the argument of fisheries protection in support of its
twelve mile claim.' Yet the greatest portion of the fish caught and
consumed by the Soviet Union comes from areas outside the Soviet waters."
In fact, the Soviet Union is an excellent example of how minimum restric-
tions on fishing throughout the world can lead to the development of a
fishing fleet; Russia's execllent and highly mechanized fishing fleets cruise
the oceans of the world in pusuit of their catches.
Any effective conservation of the world's fishery resources, which would
give at the same time maximum benefits to all nations, requires a limited
use of contiguous zones in conjunction with an international convention.
Such a convention did arise from the 1958 Conference, 7 ' and most na-
172 See Heinzen, supra note 12, at 659-60 & n.289.
'See, e.g., Neblett, Freedom of the Seas-For Fishing, 85 U.S. NAV. INST. PRoc. 85 (Feb.
1959).
'
74 Meade, The Great Territorial Sea Squabble, 95 U.S. NAv. INST. PRoc. 45 (April 1969) citing
the Libyan statement at 47:
Libya had a long seacoast, its fisheries were of great importance as a source of food
.... This country had therefore a great interest in that question [of the territorial
sea].
Libya was constantly faced with the problem of foreign fishermen who were wrong-
fully exploiting the resources of its territorial sea.
175 id.
178 Butler, supra note 191, at 69.
177 Id.
17' The Fisheries Convention is concerned with conservation of resources and national rights in
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tions showed a great desire to see it implemented. Most of the problems
on which many states based their claims to extended territorial seas were
settled by this Convention, and it appears that it was highly successful.
Even in the few instances in which the peculiar problems of one state
could not be solved by the provisions of the Convention, unilateral and
multilateral treaties have gone a long way towards solving those prob-
lems. ' The main point is that for proper conservation and development
of the sea's fisheries and for maximum benefit for each nation, extended
territorial seas present no answers, but in fact create additional problems.
Further, with the adoption of the Fisheries Convention and its potential
value, the argument that maximum territorial seas are necessary is not
valid. Further, the legal rights and obligations that are inherent in full
territorial claims in themselves have no value or relevance to the fisheries
question at all.
The questions of rights in other resources of the sea, such as develop-
ment of minerals in the seabed, have not been of much importance in
the question of the breadth of the territorial sea. The prime reason thus
far is that few nations have even made attempts to make economic use
of such resources, and efficient development of any great degree lies in the
future. But, because of the potential, these resources could present prob-
lems very similar to those presented by claims to fishery rights. Luckily,
most nations at the 1958 and 1960 conferences recognized this fact, and
the result was the Convention on the Continental Shelf and provisions in
the Convention on the Territorial Seas and the Contiguous Zones for pro-
tection and development of such resources.' o Through the application and
proper use of these two conventions, it is anticipated that undersea re-
sources will not play an important part in any future questions on the
territorial sea, though excessive claims to contiguous zones might raise
other problems.
3. The Flow of Commerce
The main basis asserted by nations refusing to recognize extended terri-
torial seas beyond approximately three miles is that this would interfere
with the free and efficient flow of seaborne commerce. Under ordinary
circumstances, this argument is obviously without a firm foundation. As
has already been described, the well recognized right of innocent passage
through territorial seas allows reasonable claims and enforcement of those
claims without interference with commercial traffic."' Admittedly, a na-
tion could, if it desired, use its territorial claim to disrupt such traffic,
but it is submitted that such action would take place with or without a
problem of territorial rights if a nation felt such a procedure to be in its
best interests. The right of innocent passage as recognized in international
the high seas, and does not, of course, directly consider the question of territorial waters. It does,
however, settle many of the problems which caused the fisheries question to be related to the terri-
torial seas problem.
179 See, e.g., supra note 172 and sources cited therein.
1 See supra notes 87 & 92 and accompanying text.
1s8 See section IV (B) (1) supra.
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law has been codified and even expanded in the Convention on Terri-
torial Seas and the Contiguous Zones, and commerce should present no
barrier to settlement of the question of the breadth of the territorial sea."s
Supporters of the flow of commerce theory point to situations in which
nations have used the claim to territorial seas to further political motives
through the cutting of commerce. The most obvious and glaring example
of such an event occurred when the Arab states extended their territorial
seas to twelve miles in order to "legally" deny use of the Straits of Tiran
and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel." In answer, it must be pointed out
that such actions are rare today, and in all probability the same action
would be taken no matter what territorial sea was claimed, as it was de-
spite international guarantees to Israel of rights of passage.
4. National Security
It is submitted that the only rational basis remaining which can support
the various disputed claims of nations to a proper breadth for a territorial
sea is that of national security. It is further submitted that, as will be
shown, even this field of interest can no longer be rationally related to a
territorial sea, but can be better settled by special rules and continguous
zones relating to military and naval problems.
Concepts of national security and defense are no longer related to the
protection of the coast itself but to the freedom of action and flexibility
of military, naval, and air power throughout the world. The United States
is today the greatest seapower on earth, despite the rapid growth of the
Soviet Navy, and many political and military policies are based on that
seapower.'" Therefore, with its widespread commitments, the United
States is particularly interested in maintaining maximum freedom of the
seas. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is interested in limiting the
use of United States seapower, as evidenced by its insistence on a maximum
territorial sea coupled with a denial of any right of passage for warships
without permission."s' The effect of the Soviet attempt can be seen when
it is considered that any general world-wide extension of the territorial
sea to twelve miles would remove from the regime of the high seas an
... The three main articles on innocent passage contained in the Convention on the Territorial
Seas are, in part:
Article 5 which provides that when straight base lines established under Article 4 enclose what
had previously been high seas, a right of innocent passage shall exist in those waters.
Article 14(1) provides that, subject to the provisions of the Convention, "ships of all states,
whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." The
article goes on to define innocent passage as that which is "not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal state."
Article 16 provides in part that "subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the coastal state
may, without discrimination amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its
territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection
of its security.
'8' See, e.g., supra note 1 and sources cited therein.
1S4See, e.g., The Politics of Seapower, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1968, at 35; Amine, Seapower and
the Superpowers, 94 U.S. NAy. INST. PROc. 26 (Oct. 1968); Sweitzer, Sovereignty and the SLBM,
92 U.S. NAy. INST. PRoc. 32 (Sept. 1966).
"' See, e.g., Butler, The Legal Regime of Russian Territorial Waters, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 69
(1968). At the 1968 Convention, the Soviet Union consistently refused to recognize any convention
which would give even a limited right of innocent passage to foreign warships, unless such passage
was subject to the permission and rules and regulations of the state claiming the waters in question.
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area of approximately 3,000,000 square miles. In the Mediterranean alone,
presently an area in which seapower is playing a major role, the high seas
would be reduced by about 145,000 square miles. One hundred sixteen
straits and passages around the world would then be entirely within the
territorial waters of one or more nations. "' When coupled with a limited
or a complete denial of a right of passage for warships, the result on naval
flexibility can be seen. Even if a right of free, innocent passage were
extended to warships, aircraft have no such right, whether military or
civil, and would still require permission, thus putting a severe limit on
the value of air transport for military purposes. Until the Soviet Union
and the United States can resolve in some way the problems and aims
presented, there is little chance for settlement of the question of the
territorial sea.
This is not to say that the position of the Soviet Union is unalterable any
more than is that of the United States. The United States has shown a
willingness to extend the territorial sea to a maximum of six miles, and if
proper provisions were made for defense zones and control of passage for
warships, the Soviet Union would probably present a much more flexible
attitude.' 7 Both nations rely heavily on seaborne commerce today and
have a vital interest in maximum freedom of the seas. With the growth
of Soviet seapower, both have an interest in maximum freedom for naval
power.
Many of the smaller nations have their own interests in a reasonable
territorial sea for purposes of neutrality. The rights and obligations that
are attendant on a claim of neutrality are often extremely heavy, and
the wider the area in which neutrality is claimed, the heavier the burden.
Just what the optimum breadth would be for small nations is difficult to
say, but for purposes of national security, a distance of from three to
six miles presents the maximum that can be effectively policed for neu-
trality purposes.
As can be seen from the above discussion, the basis of "national security"
still has some validity in the dispute over territorial waters. However, as
with fisheries control, the problems could probably be settled without
reference to claims of a full territorial sea. Until the nations concerned
are willing to face the above problems openly, however, as they have
evidently avoided doing in the past, there is little chance for settlement.
E. Any Solution For The Future?
Even with most of the underlying problems settled by various means,
the lack of definition for the breadth of the territorial sea is troublesome,
confusing, and often dangerous. Unfortunately, there does not seem to
be any real chance for settlement in the near future, especially if the great
seapowers refuse to openly face and discuss the matters raised under the
discussion of national interests.
188 Sweitzer, suPra note 214, at 38.
17 Id. at 39. Defense zones are very common for both the United States and the Soviet Union,
particularly submarine and air defense areas which are under rigid control.
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The situation, however, is not as hopeless as it may seem at first glance.
The six plus six proposal presented by the United States and Canada is
the most promising. In 1960, it failed by only one vote being adopted by
the 87 nations present, and conditions would seem to be even more favor-
able for its passage today were another conference to be convened. Many
of the newer nations are taking a much more realistic view of the situa-
tion, and, while the anti-colonial bias is still strong, they are recognizing
that such bias should not take precedence over national interests. The
states which urge protection of fisheries and claim such wide contiguous
zones for that purpose are retreating to some extent in the fact of inter-
national pressure and economic fact. Finally, the position of the Arab
states, in relation to Israel has been changed by the 1967 war. Any lasting
settlement of the Middle East dispute will have to include a right of
passage for Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran which can be
enforced and maintained, thus removing a major stumbling block in the
way of passage of the six plus six proposal.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the six plus six proposal is the only
settlement that will be accepted by the great majority of nations. It repre-
sents a definite and workable compromise for all purposes, even the
politico-military interests extant today. It is also submitted, however,
that until the question of the breadth of the territorial sea is divorced from
essentially unrelated political disputes no solution can ever be reached, and
the friction can only increase as use of the problem as a political ploy is
increased.
Bowen L. Florsheim
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